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2 Cross-modal illusions refer to cases where interpretation of stimuli is affected by another sensory modality, where 




























                                                        
 
3  Fechner, G. (1860) Elemente der Psychophysik, developed Weber-Fechner Law, an idea first put forward by E. H. 
Weber in 1846. It states the “relations between intensities of stimulus and intensities of sensation, and promised to 
qualify psychology (as "psychophysics") for membership in the select circle of the quantitative and experimental 
sciences.” (Perry 1935b: 3-4) William James examines a variety of Helmholtz’s conclusions in Principles of Psychology, 








                                                        
 










                                                        
 
5 Grounded and qualitative research methodologies advocate that responses should be gathered until ‘saturation’ is 









                                                        
 
6 Huw Price’s take on the relation is discussed further in chapter 4. Hilary Putnam’s take on the relation is discussed 













                                                        
 
7 Initially I read the psychology of William James in order to develop an historical framing of cognitive psychology but 
found in his pragmatist and radical empiricist approach to psychology and philosophy many relevant tools for 
approaching questions of experience that sought to give a naturalistic account of the philosophical questions raised. 
Considering James’ philosophy in the context of pragmatism and subsequent interpretations and responses lead to 
intersections between philosophy of mind and narratology and the relations between that which is taken as the real, 
imagined, truth and fiction. 
 



























                                                        
 
9 Ryan’s (2010: 472) definition of classical narratology, is not concerned with selecting of individual features of text but 
































stability.	2) Investigating	the	effects	multi-stability	through	the	collaborative10	development	of	locative	narrative	smartphone	apps	involving	an	iterative	process	of	development	and	testing	with	small	groups	of	participants	through	the	successive	production	of	prototypes.	3) Reflecting	upon	own	experience	and	creating	analyses.	4) Evaluating	participant	experience	with	semi-structured	interviews	and	open	questionnaires.	5) Classifying	reported	features	of	experience,	identifying	the	relations	in	experience	and	phenomena	reported.	6) Analysis	and	interpretation	of	reports	in	the	context	of	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework	and	broader	intersecting	domains.11		7) Developing	strategies	for	producing	the	effect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	and	incorporating	findings	into	successive	prototypes.	
                                                        
 
10 Detailed records of the collaborative process of development of the locative narrative apps, conducted with the 
developer James Brocklehurst, are included in Appendix 1. and discussed as case studies in chapters 3-5. 
 
 
11 A dialogue is created between the Jamesian thematics of experience and contemporary perspectives in cognitive 
























































































































                                                        
 
12 Todorov (2014 [1966] 382) credits the “explicit” formulation of story and discourse to Émile Benveniste.  
 
13 Todorov published as translation of a number of Russian Formalist articles in 1965 (Théorie de la littérature, textes 
des formalistes russes) including that of Tomashevsky. There are various spellings of sujet (sjuzhet, sjužet) sujet is used 









                                                        
14 A point similarly made by Jakobson in Style in Language (1960). The difficulty of this differentiation is discussed 









                                                        
 
15 Todorov (1969: 75) explains “This term “equilibrium," which I am borrowing from genetic psychology, means the 
existence of a stable but not static relation between the members of a society; it is a social law, a rule of the game, a 
























                                                        
 


















































































                                                        
 
17 Vladimir Propp Morphology of the Folk Tale (1928) 
 
18 Structuralist approaches to narrative in the development of A.I. storytelling systems been given particular 














































































































small”	(2009	[1958]:	66).	In	Wittgenstein’s	terms,	the	identity	of	words	is	not	fixed,	nor	their	relations	to	the	world,	the	emphasis	is	upon	the	context	of	use,	the	transaction	between	users	and	the	network	of	relations	the	use	of	language	enters	into.		In	‘Death	of	the	Author’	(1977:	146)	Barthes’s	writing	takes	a	more	pragmatic	turn	emphasising	the	text	as	“performative”	[utterances]	after	“Oxford	philosophy”, such	as	J.	L.	Austin	and	Wittgenstein.	The	literary	work	does	not	communicate	a	meaning	directly	from	the	author,	and	writing	itself	is	“intertexual”	–	a	composite	complied	from	a	‘storehouse	of	language’,	to	paraphrase	Peirce,19	and	its	previous	configurations.		 “…the	book	itself	is	only	a	tissue	of	signs,	an	imitation	that	is	lost,	infinitely	deferred…the	space	of	writing	is	to	be	ranged	over,	not	pierced;	writing	ceaselessly	posits	meaning	ceaselessly	to	evaporate	it,	carrying	out	a	systematic	exemption	of	meaning.”	(Barthes	1977:	147)			James	emphases	the	role	of	context	and	the	particular	use	of	language	for	interpretation	and	meaning.	Words	have	relations	to	the	rest	of	the	sentence	and	external	relations	to	the	context,	the	"experienceable	environment"	(James	MT	1909:	42fn).	The	word	‘winter’	suggests	certain	temperatures	in	a	particular	situation	but	it	cannot	guarantee	them,	the	term	must	take	account	and	in	the	context	of	sensible	facts	(P	1907:265).	Terms	guide	us	towards	what	we	may	expect,	they	are	“instruments”	but	it	is	in	the	stream	of	life,	in	the	particular	happening	of	a	context.			 3) Multi-stability	of	language	is	a	play	with	possibilities.	There	is	a	disruption	to	the	flow,	in	which	there	is	a	flip	between	the	self-referential,	an	awareness	of	the	act	of	
                                                        
 










































































































































                                                        
 
20 The metaphor of ‘multi-stability’ has three aspects; perception as multi-stable (above and below conscious 
awareness); language as multi-stable; beliefs about what is real or true as multi-stable; resting on a feeling of 
rationality. 
 
21 James’ friend and contemporary, Chauncey Wright, was an early defender and promoter of Darwin in America 
around this period (Misak 2013: 16). 
 
22 James’ student and biographer, Ralph Barton Perry (1935: 209, 220) describes James’ studies under Jefferies 
Wyman the Hersey Professor of Anatomy in the Harvard Medical School where Darwin was keenly discussed among 
his contemporaries and in the following year his systematic examination of the philosophical questions of evolution 








                                                        
 
23 Carlos Blanco (2014: 1) notes the that sources for James’ theories of habit derive from Léon Dumont (PBC 1932 
[1892]: 135) a French psychologist after the writings of following August Comte (1798–1857) Benjamin Carpenter 
(1813–1885), an English physician, physiologist and comparative neurologist, Scottish empirical philosopher and 
psychologist Alexander Bain (1818–1903), and English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873).  
 
Bain’s writings on habit, in Emotions and the Will (1876) and Senses and the Intellect (1879) influenced both Peirce 
and James (PP 1890a: 122-123). James (PP 1890b: 6, 12) cites Bain’s view that sensations do not have knowledge of 
things and that as concurring with his own view. James (PP 1890a: 245) praises Bain’s notion of the stream of thought 
in Emotions and the Will with reference to his own formulation of the stream of thought. Habit is also a central theme 
of C. S. Peirce’s philosophy. James and Peirce shared an interest in the physical ramifications of habit. This idea is 








                                                        
 
24 James’ use of the word concatenated to describe habit is later used extensively in his post 1900 radical empiricist 








                                                        
 
25 (PP 1890b: 619) (My bold to indicate this is a key point that is taken up in chapter two.) 
 















                                                        
 
27 James uses the word ‘consciousness’ throughout his writings to refer to a variety of ideas, such as:  
• In an early article ‘On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology’ (James 1884: 1) (1884) 
James says that consciousness is “esse to sentiri” – to be sensed – immediate awareness of 
sensation. This is arguably a subversion of Berkeley’s idealist expression: esse percipi – to be is 
to be perceived. For James, perception considers sensation in retrospect, in conscious acts that 
come after. 
• “Intelligent intelligence” attention directed towards thinking (CER 1920 [1878]: 64). 
• Automatic responses, reflex action (PP 1890a: 13-14) 
• Primary and secondary self (PP 1890a: 209-210, 233) 
• Fringe of relations (PP 1890a: 82) “Let us use the words psychic overtone, suffusion, or fringe, to 
designate the influence of a faint brain-process upon our thought, as it makes it aware of 
relations and objects but dimly perceived.” (PP 1890a: 258) 
• Subliminal consciousness (outside of conscious awareness) (VRE 1902: 483) 
•  “Below the level of immediate consciousness”, (VRE 1902:125), “extra-marginal” (VRE 1902: 
233). 
• ‘The knowner’ - the function of thoughts is knowing (ERE 1912 [1904]: 3) 
• “A thing known” (ERE 1912 [1904]: 10) thinking about. 
• Consciousness as a separate entity (ERE 1912 [1904]: 17) or ‘mind-stuff’ is rejected (PP 1890a: 
145). 
• There is no consciousness that is separate from content James argues in his later radical 
empiricist writings (ERE 1912: 9) (1977 [1905]: 187). 
 
28 James in Psychology, the Briefer Course (1892), his abridged and revised version of Principles, he renames the 
stream of thought chapter as ‘the stream of consciousness’. He later goes back to discussing a stream of thought in his 
1904 essay ‘Does Consciousness Exist?’, where he rejects the term consciousness as being too loaded with 


















                                                        
 
29 James rejects this idea, offering ten proofs, and concluding there is no experimental evidence (PP 1890a: 145).  
 
30 Many examples of this idea: Principles 1890a: 82, 256, 258-259, 264-265, 271, 275. James’ metaphor “chromatic 
fringes” of attention seems to draw upon Helmholtz’s work on Optics, the at the threshold of vision (PP 1890a: 285). 
 
31 James gives an extensive review and critique of the most recent psychophysical research in attention, including that 
by Helmholtz and Wundt Principles Vol.1 chapter 11, (PP 1890a: 411-482) and Psychology, the Briefer Course (PBC 
1892: 217-238)  
 





























                                                        
 
33 From a contemporary neuroscience perspective this is akin to what is termed a “tracking” account of perception, 













                                                        
 
34 ‘Ambulatory’ relations discussed: James, W. (1909b) ‘One More Word About Truth’. In The Meaning of Truth. New 
York & London: Longmans, Green and Co. p.138, and James, W. (1920) ‘Remarks On Spencer’s Definition of Mind as 









                                                        
 
35 James’ inverted commas (PP	1890a:	183) 
 










                                                        
 
37 When James’ uses introspection to mean immediate ‘feltness’ he refers to its phenomenal and naïve sense, not in 
the term’s use as a psychological method, or as James says, “babies in cradles would be psychologists” (1890a: 189). 
This is the difference is between introspection as a feeling and introspection as psychological method where a body of 
















                                                        
 
38 “It must assume realities; but it prejudges nothing as to their constitution, and the most diverse metaphysics can 
use it as their foundation. It certainly has no special affinity with solipsism.” (1909b: 215) 
 
39 James’ viewpoint is consistent with Linguistic pragmatists non-foundationist view in second half 20th and 21st 
century also, who argue that perceptual experience cannot be credited with revealing truths or ‘truthful knowledge’. 
Discuss further in chapter 4 of this text.   
 
40 This idea is articulated throughout James’ writings, some examples: (WTB 1910 [1897]: 24), (P 1907: 270, 273), (MT 

















                                                        
 
41 ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’ (1898) the lecture in which James gives the term pragmatism has 
its first public expression. 
 
42 Peirce expands his view on the differences between his own and James’ pragmatism in Baldwin’s Philosophical 
Dictionary (1902) and develops his version of pragmatism in three articles published in The Monist between 1905-6. 
Peirce and James’ pragmatism is discussed further in Appendix 2.  
 
43 A point John Dewey (1923 [1916]: 302) has made. 
 
44 Peirce’s use of habit is consistent with James’ physiological and the psychological framing.  
 
45 Peirce in contrast to James is concerned with “generals” – not particulars, with testing the truth of propositions and 









                                                        
 
46 This point discussed further in Appendix 2 of this text. 
 
47 ‘Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence’ (1878) and to a greater extent, ‘The Function of 
Cognition’ (1884). James details his early pragmatist ideas in Meaning of Truth (1909: 42-43 endnote) 
 
48 This is what shapes our human existence, according to the “humanistic conception”, James says. The Humanist 
approach to truth of F. S. Schiller at Oxford and John Dewey’s approach at Chicago (MT 1909: 64) closely reflected 
James’ pragmatism.  
 
“…the generalized notion of the workability of the feeling or idea as equivalent to that 
satisfactory adaptation to the particular reality, which constitutes the truth of the idea. It 
is this more generalized notion, as covering all such specifications as pointing, fitting, 
operating or resembling, that distinguishes the developed view of Dewey, Schiller48, and 















                                                        
 
49 Gombrich (2002 [1959]: 24) sketches the lineage of the thesis of ‘interpretation as hypothesis forming’, from Kant to 
















                                                        
 
50 We can see Peirce making a similar argument but put in a logical form, where he labels this type of belief an acritical 










                                                        
 
51 James describes the relation between subject and object, after Brentano in his discussion on belief in an objects’ 
existence. 
“The way in which the ideas are combined is a part of the inner constitution of the 
thought’s object or content. That object is sometimes an articulated whole with relations 
between its parts, amongst which relations, that of predicate to subject may be one. But 
when we have got our object with its inner constitution thus defined in a proposition, then 
the question comes up regarding the object as a whole: ‘Is it a real object? is this 
proposition a true proposition or not?’ And in the answer Yes to this question lies that 

















                                                        
 
52 James’ view is reflected by current neuroscience research, King, A. J. (2006) ‘Auditory neuroscience: activating the 
cortex without sound. Current Biology. June 6; 16 (11), R410-1. 
 
53 This echo’s Peirce’s claim in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ (Peirce 1923 [1878]: 5) 
 
54 James (ERE 1912: 18) says Hugo Münsterberg refers to imaginings as “parts of reality” in Münsterberg’s Grundziige 
der Psychologie, vol. I, [Basics Elements of Psychology] (Münsterberg 1874: 48). James accounts, “I find this objectivity 
of non-perceptual experiences, this complete parallelism in point of reality between the presently felt and the 
remotely thought, so well set forth in a page of Münsterberg's Grundziige.”	 
 
55 In ‘The Physical Basis Of Emotion’ (CER 1920 [1894]: 346) James (CER 1920 [1894]: 348) explains that the psychical 








                                                        
secondary not the primary effect of a stimulus, coincides with that of his contemporary James Lange. James and Lange 
had independently published articles on this subject expressing similar views in 1884, however, James differs with 
Lange on a number of details that he outlines in this essay, including that Lange puts too much emphasis on the role 
of vascular constriction of the blood vessels in emotion. He disagrees with Lange that constriction of blood vessels in 











                                                        
 
56 James rejects Galileo, Descartes, Kant and others insistence that ‘affects’ are purely mental phenomena (ERE 1912: 








                                                        
 
57 In Principles James references research by Myers (1886) on the “subliminal” consciousness and Alfred Binet's 
Alterations of Personality (1896) 
 
58 Where as James gives the subconscious a physiological basis in Varieties and in Principles (1890) where James 
describes psychology as “the study of finite minds”, Owen Flanagan (1992: 43) points out James’ discussion diverges 
from a strictly materialist account of consciousness in his lecture ‘Human Immortality’ (James 1899 [1898]: 12), where 
he permits the possibility that some part of consciousness may continue after death. James bases this claim on the 
grounds that the brain is “productive” of thoughts and also “transmissive” of thoughts, using the metaphor of the 
prism that can transmit colours via the light that passes through it to illustrate his point (James 1899 [1898]: 14-15). 
However, James’ apparently contradictory views are not necessarily inconsistent with his pluralism, where the 













                                                        
 
59 Peirce articulates a similar view in ‘How to Make Ideas Clear’ – thought is one system of relations59 whose sole 


















                                                        
 
60 In his assertion of pluralism is found in publication at least as early as Will to Believe (WB 1897: viii) This point is also 
noted by G. E. Myers (1986: 366) who thinks a better description is “neutral pluralist.” 
 
61 ‘Radical pluralism’ is a more accurate label, a term James used himself:  
 
“These are the main features of a philosophy of pure experience… In my own mind such a 
philosophy harmonizes best with a radical pluralism, with novelty and indeterminism, moralism 
and theism, and with the 'humanism' lately sprung upon us by the Oxford and the Chicago 
schools. I cannot, however, be sure that all these doctrines are its necessary and indispensable 









                                                        
 
62 Soft determinism refers to James’ discussion in Chapter 5 ‘The Dilemma of Determinism’ we can make be choices 
about our lives and therefore we are morally culpable but ultimately the world on a physical level is deterministic. 
James sees this view as fudge that does not have any intellectual rigor - you can’t have it both ways, he argues (James 
1910 [1897]: 166). 
 
63 James (1910 [1897]: 146) says, after the contemporary French philosopher Charles Renouvier, whom James later 








                                                        
 
64 These articles are later published posthumously as a collection Essays of Radical Empiricism (1912). Ralph Barton 
Perry, James’ former student, biographer and the collection’s editor, tells us (1912: preface) that James had already 
planned the structure of the book and made available the bound the collection the articles for students in the Harvard 
library. The final edition predominately matches that of James’ plan plus some additional articles. 
 
65 James refers to radical empiricism as a philosophical attitude in Will to Believe (WB 1897: vii) and as doctrine in 
Pragmatism (P 1907: ix) and The Meaning of Truth (MT 1909: xii), as Perry notes in his preface to Essays in Radical 
Empiricism, see note above. 
 










                                                        
 















                                                        
 
68 Substance has been framed variously (SPP 1911:124): The Substance theory of Aristotle; Descartes says that 
properties adhere because there is a substance; Locke says there is a substratum in which properties inhere but that 
categories, our boundaries between qualities are man-made and to some extent arbitrary; and Kant’s notion of a 
transcendent reality outside of experience, that James rejects. James discusses the British empiricists questioning the 
notion of substance (P 1907: 88-90), (SPP 1911: 116, 121).	
 
69 The matrix of experience: ego (that he defines as the memory of personal history), space and time are the only 


















                                                        
 
70 What James is referring to here is postulated transcendental experiences such that which Kant asserts. 
 
71 For James, the lack of acknowledgement of disjunctive relations is problematic not just in terms of epistemology 
and ontology but also for grammatical logic indicated by the Law of Excluded Middle and the Logic of Identity. He 
offers alternative possibilities to the formulation where the particular relations of terms do not fix their identities and 
leave the potential for plurality of meanings. It can be argued James’ (ERE 1912 [1884]: 266-276) argument hints 









                                                        
 
72 James notes however, that the classical object-predicate structure of logic is now being challenged and that 
concepts in physics are now being considered as ways to handle reality rather than uncovering existent truth (SPP 



















Fig 2:  Diagram of the four thematics of experience on which supervenes the metaphor of multi-stability, on which 
supervenes language as multi-stable  	
Thematics of 
Experience
• Action, habit, thinking-perceiving; 
• The intentional contents of thought; 
• Truth and believing; 
• Feeling, affect and sentiment.
Multi-stability
• Perception as multi-stable (above and below conscious awareness); 
• Language as multi-stable; 
• Beliefs about what is real or true as multi-stable; resting on a feeling of rationality.
Language as 
Multi-stable
• The multi-stability of language supervenes on the normative functioning of language;  
• Normative functioning and the multi-stability of language operate in relation to particular 
context;



























d) Distance	e) Position	f) Direction	g) Movement	h) Velocity		Relations	to	ourselves	“intelligent	intelligence”	(James	1920	[1878]:	64),	a) Relations	to	conscious	awareness:	as	vivid,	as	vague,	as	on	the	fringes	or	threshold.		b) Relations	to	the	experiences	of	perception	and	misperception	c) Relations	to	the	experience	of	imagining	d) Relations	to	action	and	volition		e) Relations	to	the	experience	of	attention		Relations	to	feelings	and	sensations	a) Relations	to	bodily	sensations	b) Relations	to	emotions	c) Relations	to	feelings	d) Relations	to	will,	volition		e) Relations	to	intuitions		Relations	to	values	a) Relations	of	presence	(to	different	worlds73)	
                                                        
 
73 James characterizes individuals’ categories of experience as “worlds”. These can be described as classes whose 
members share a logic of acting and influencing one another – the logic physics, of ethics, or of fantasy and fiction. 







b) Relations	to	interest	c) Relations	to	reality	d) Relations	to	hypotheses	e) Relations	to	knowledge	f) Relations	to	skill	g) Relations	to	belief	h) Relations	to	truth	i) Relations	to	beauty	(taste	as	a	weaker	form)	j) Relations	to	rationality	k) Relations	to	fiction	l) Relations	to	ethics			In	the	chapters	that	follow,	this	Jamesian	relational	taxonomy,	informed	by	the	four	parameters	of	experiential	framework,	is	applied	in	the	analysis	of	four	locative	narrative	case	studies,	together	with	participants’	reports	of	experience.						
                                                        
 
There are different worlds with different modes of existence, James tells us listing seven categories, “(1) physical 
things “as we intuitively apprehend them”, heat, colour, sound; (2) the “scientific world” of physical things; (3) “ideal 
world of relations and abstract truths”, mathematics, logical propositions, ethics, aesthetics; (4) “The world of idols of 
the tribe, illusions or prejudices common to the race”; (5) supernatural worlds of religions and mythology, of fiction 
“Whilst absorbed in the novel, we turn our backs on all other worlds, and, for the time, the Ivanhoe-world remains our 
absolute reality. When we wake from the spell, however, we find a still more real world, which reduces Ivanhoe, and 
all things connected with him, to the fictive status, and relegates them to one of the sub-universes grouped under No. 
5.” (P291-292 footnotes); (6) “Worlds of individual opinion”; (7) “The worlds of sheer madness and vagary, also 
indefinitely numerous.” (James 1890b: 291-292) 
 
 “Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or another of this or of some 














                                                        
 
74 Peirce, C. S. ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’. The Monist. Vol. 16, No. 4 (October, 1906), pp. 492-546 










































                                                        
 
75 ‘Mind Games’ a practice of (non-drug induced) guided imaginary experiences developed by Robert 
Masters and Jean Houston (1972) based on research at The Foundation for Mind Research, initially 




























































                                                        


















                                                        80	Westerkamp	(1974:	21)	invites	us	to	part	take	in	other	“participatory	soundwalks”:	to	orientate	ourselves	on	a	dark	night	to	listening	to	the	sounds	of	our	body	and	the	reciprocal	sounds	of	the	body;	to	navigate	through	a	city	by	asking strangers 
































































                                                        
 
83 LARPs from 1970’s occurred in the Nordic countries, UK, USA, Australia and USSR, there is no agreement on where 
the first LARP occurred (Montola et al 2009: 36).  Söderberg et al (2004) states, “During the 1980ies, LARPs was a very 
narrow sub-culture playing almost completely in the world of Tolkien fantasy. Today, especially in Scandinavia and UK, 
it is a growing popular movement for people of all ages and every game stretches the boundaries of the subjects 
explored.”  
 



































































                                                        
87 Detailed records of the collaborative process conducted with the developer James Brocklehurst are included in 








                                                        
 
88 This thesis addresses the following questions: 
 
1) What framework of experience usefully sets the parameters for articulating the metaphor of multi-stability? 
2) How can the affect of the metaphor of multi-stability be created in locative narratives? 
3) How can the affect of metaphor of multi-stability be measured and interpreted? 
 
A summary of methods: 
 
1) Desk based research informing hypotheses upon affect of the metaphor of multi-stability. 
2) Investigating the affect of the metaphor of multi-stability through the collaborative development of locative 
narrative smartphone apps produced through an iterative process of development and testing with small 
groups of participants through the successive production of prototypes. 
3) Reflecting upon own experience and creating analyses. 
4) Evaluating participant experience with semi-structured interviews and questionnaires. 
5) Classifying reported features of experience, identifying the relations in experience and phenomena reported. 
6) Analysis and interpretation of reports in the context of the Jamesian experiential framework and broader 
intersecting domains.  
7) Developing strategies for producing the affect of the metaphor of multi-stability and incorporating findings 
into successive prototypes. 
 
89 Participants took part in semi-structured interviews, where their comments were recorded in written notes 
verbatim. 
 









                                                        
 











                                                        
 
92 This idea is articulated throughout James’ writings, some examples: (WTB 1910 [1897]: 24), (P 1907: 270, 273), (MT 
1909: 64), (SPP 1911: 223) 
 
93 I proposed changes to the app and James Brocklehurst implemented the app development in Objective C for iOS. 
 











                                                        
 
95 Initial usability questions: Do the voices trigger in the predetermined locations? Do the voices triggers singularly? 
Can the correct soundscape be heard with the associated voices? Can another soundscapes be heard at the ‘edges’ of 
the zone of the triggered soundscape? To what extent are zones drifting? Can ambient sounds be heard concurrently 
with the recorded sound?  
 













                                                        
 
97 Further conditions and fixes were proposed by EW and then implemented and tested with James Brocklehurst. 
 
98 The Lost Index, Game 2, The Turning, was tested with 35 participants, aged between 16-60 years. Four open 
questions asked about the experience: Can you please describe: your overall experience of the game; your experience 






















                                                        
 
99 ‘The experiment’ was how Dorothy Whitney Straight and Leonard Elmhirst in their travel correspondence referred 
to moving to England to start an educational agricultural experiment similar to that initiated by the poet Tagore in 
India that Leonard Elmhirst had helped run in 1924.  
 
100 Forming a small part of the forms part of the Dartington Hall Trust archive, personal correspondence between 
Dorothy Whitney Straight and Leonard Elmhirst of January and March 1925, held at the Devon County Record Office 









Fig. 1, The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens. Initial sketches for thematic coding of archived letters. 		Evocation	of	the	world	of	the	story	became	the	initial	focus	of	the	first	prototype.101	In	the	development	of	the	narrative	there	were	two	early	concerns:	structure	and	participation	with	the	narrative.	Various	models	of	interaction	were	considered:	the	‘branching	path’	model	utilized	in	a	previous	project,102	offered	the	potential	to	create	engaging	interactive	experience	but	multiple	trajectories	can	be	unwieldy	in	terms	of	the	quantity	audio	material	
                                                        
 
101 The relationships between narrative, participation and sound design are detailed a series of tables accompanying 
each prototype.  
 























                                                        
 
103 Six voice artists were recorded. The voices of Phil Smith and Anne Kelly were selected after initial testing of the 
prototypes in response from feedback from participants. The qualities of the actors’ voices were of particular concern 
for participants who preferred voices that they considered to ‘fit’ the characters and those whom they ‘felt’ some 


















Fig. 4 The Letters, version 1. Location of one of the voice points in the garden. 		The	GPS	accuracy	within	parts	of	the	garden	ranged	from	ten	to	forty-seven	metres.	As	a	result,	the	sound	zones	and	voices	‘drifted’	(the	shifting	of	plotted	GPS	points	due	to	signal	strength,	weather,	physical	obstructions,	etc.)	from	their	intended	sites,	affecting	the	visual	connections	between	the	virtual	sonic	locations	and	randomly	triggering	sounds	on	and	off,	as	the	participants’	position	registered	as	being	in	or	out	of	a	zone.	Several	conditions104	to	mitigate	the	problem	were	tried,	such	as	triggering	one	voice	at	a	time,	playing	to	the	end	before	a	new	voice	starting,	only	retriggering	after	ten	minutes,	etc.	Beta	testing	showed	that	
                                                        
 
104 The smartphone prototypes were developed for iPhone in Objective C for iOS. In a process of collaborative 









	 	 	 	





















Fig. 6 The Letters, version 1 ‘scattered voice points’. Diagram showing spatial sound design plan for ‘Rome’ zone, 
transposed onto location in garden. 		Binaural	and	stereo	recordings	of	historical	vehicles	of	the	period	were	made	at	the	Black	Country	Living	Museum.105	Both	binaural	recordings	and	synthesized	binaural	sound	were	used	to	create	a	sense	of	the	spatial	dimensions	of	the	virtual	locations.	Listening	on	
                                                        
 










                                                        
 















Fig. 7 The Letters, version 1. Screenshot from app prototype, showing a zone becoming active upon participant 






















Fig. 8 The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 2 ‘button selection’. Plan for position of zones  









Fig. 9 The Letters, version 2 ‘button selection’. App screens. 
 
                                                        
 
107In response to EW’s participation design requirements James Brocklehurst created the illustration for the map 










                                                        
 
108 Creating texture in soundscapes was discussed with Nick Ryan in April 2012 in relation to his compositions for the 































                                                        
 
109 This prototype was partially realized using sample sections of the narrative and sound. The idea of non-playing 

















Fig. 10 The Letters, version 3 ‘text messages’. Screenshots from app prototype of initial screen simulating a text 

























































                                                        
 
110 Excerpt from the LociOscope manual:  
 
“The LociOscope works by amplifying the emotional resonance found in specific locations. This 
edition of the LociOScope has been calibrated to detect the imprints left behind by this 
treasured collection of letters associated with Dartington Hall Gardens. The LociOscope gives 









Fig. 13 The Letters, version 4, final version. Screenshot from app prototype showing  
early version of voice points represented on map prototype and zones as areas of ‘disturbance’. 	Designs	for	the	LociOscope’s	interaction	design	and	style	were	sketched	to	reflect	domestic	machines	of	the	era	of	the	letters111.	Finding	entry	points	to	the	past	became	the	premise	for	participant’s	participation	in	the	gardens.	Drift	was	incorporated	into	the	experience	as	a	process	of	tuning-in,	through	movement	and	readjustment	of	the	participant’s	position.	This	prototype	used	a	refined	version	of	the	second	map.112	In	response	to	participants’	comments	for	enhanced	clarity,	colour	contrast	was	increased	and	the	entry	points	to	the	virtual	
                                                        
 
111 From sketches and design specification James Brocklehurst developed the visual appearance of the LociOscope.  
 
112 The design specifications where developed by EW in response to participants’ responses to testing. Design 









Fig. 14 The Letters, version 4, final version. Screenshot from final app. The ‘LociOscope’ instruction manual. 		
                                                        
 









Fig. 15 The Letters, version 4, final version. Screenshot from final app. The ‘LociOscope’ instruction manual, 










Fig. 16 The Letters, version 4, final version. Screenshots from final app. Introductory instructions and a zone being 
activated by the participant. 		
	
 


















                                                        
 
114 The instructions were too wordy for some and future updates will include incremental instructions as the 
participant operates the app to avoid the necessity of reading lots of text at the beginning with more detailed 
instructions available as optional windows that can be accessed via the map. Some participants also commented that 






































Fig. 19 ‘LociOscope’ for Plymouth City Museum and Art Gallery. Plan for app concept trialled at Plymouth City Museum 
and Art Gallery. 	An	indoor	navigation	system	based	was	trialled115	that	was	designed	to	trigger	sound	files	in	relation	to	participants’	location	within	the	museum,	however,	in	practice,	the	Wi-Fi	signals	available	were	not	of	a	sufficient	strength	to	make	this	suitable	in	this	building.	As	a	result	manual	triggering	of	soundscapes	was	used	to	experiment	with	the	listening	experience.		The	variety	and	levels	of	low	level	sounds,	such	as,	background	music	in	the	cafe,	distant	voices,	heating	systems	and	that	of	localized	loud	sounds,	such	as,	visitor	voices,	sound	effects	within	the	museum	displays	made	the	soundscapes	confusing.	The	spatial	subtleties	of	the	binaural	sound	also	appeared	less	illusionistic,	masked	by	the	array	of	ambient	sounds.	However,	the	museum’s	‘soundscape’	did	offer	a	potential	new	medium	for	experimenting	with	shifting	perception	and	creating	narratives	with	the	museum	itself	as	a	setting.		
                                                        
 
115 SenionLab navigation software was trialled that functioned by combining the coordinates of pre-mapped paths 
around the museum with positioning data derived by fingerprinting Wi-Fi signals in conjunction with the map and 
tagged sound files. Public Wi-Fi was not installed in the museum and signals coming from offices and neighbouring 































































                                                        
 
116 Stimuli received by sensory receptors as light, or the movement of air particles, are converted into short electrical 
pluses or neuronal firings as an electrical signal to the brain. These electrical pulses, pass into nerve cells (neurons) 
that are surrounded by and contain ions, electrically charged molecules. The voltage of internal and external ions is 
polarized. Stimulation of a nearby neuron changes the external charge and causes an exchange of ions with those 
inside the cell, resulting in possible outcomes: action potential, inhibitors of neural transmitters, enzyme activity or 
muscle contractions. In turn, this neuron interacts across the synapse with other cells, binding or not, with the 
receptors of other cells. Patterns of neurons, determined by the size of the neuron and the number and duration 
between firings carry particular information. Different types of neurotransmitters carry interacting patterns of 














                                                        
 
117 Psychophysics is the empirical study of the relations between a perceptual stimulus and the perceptual response. 
Psychoacoustics of hearing examines the relationships between the physical characteristics of sound and its 









                                                        
 
The auditory perception of the position of sound in the environment involves the perception of sound localization 
cues, the Interaural Time Delay (ITD) and the Interaural Level Delay (ILD). The ITD applies to lower frequency sounds 
that bend around the head causing diffraction of sound and a time difference between the arrival at the sound at one 
ear and the arrival at the sound at another ear (<~ 1500hz for a head circumference of 21cm). The ILD applies to 
higher frequency sounds that have a smaller wavelength (above 1800hz) where the listener’s head causes a shadow 
resulting in a difference in decibel levels in each ear. This also applies to lower frequency sounds heard at close 
proximity. The localization cues allow for the perception of the sound’s positioning along the horizontal plane 
(azimuth). The morphology of the listener, the shape of the pinnae, (outer ear), their head, hair and body affects the 
time at which the sound reaches each ear. Distance from the sound source can reduce perception of ILD, making 
localization determined by level difference harder to perceive at greater distances. Each pinnae filters the sound and 
the same sound presents differently to each ear in relation to the angle of the head. This contributes to the 
perception of elevation and helps the listener to determine whether the sound is located in front or behind them 
(Moore 2012: 251) (Begault 1994:42). The head also causes ‘blind spots’ in the perception of the source location, 
known as ‘the cone of confusion’ (Moore 2012: 262). Head movements can mitigate this effect and help to establish 
the perception of the sound source on the vertical plane.  Moore suggests that the pinnae themselves modify the 
spectral cues and are important for clarifying positioning on the vertical plane 
 
118 Binaural recording techniques can mimic these cues by using a dummy head with replica ears or in-ear binaural 
mics worn by the sound recordist. The head-related-transfer-function (HRTF) gives a measurement of the “spectral 
filtering of the sound source before it reaches the ear drum” (Begault 1994:52) produced by the pinnae. The HRTF is 
unique for each listener and as a result averaged HRTF used in postproduction processing of mono recordings can only 
be approximate for the individual listener. The spectral filtering that is encoded in recordings made with in-ear 
binaural mics is specific to the recordist’s pinnae and morphology and therefore this can (to some degree) affect the 
perception of elevation and frontal and backward planes (Begault 1994:53) (Nicol 2010: 20) for other listeners.   
 
Psychoacoustics of hearing examines the relationships between the physical characteristics of sound and its 
perception and interpretation by listeners (Begault 1997: xii). The auditory perception of the position of sound in the 
environment involves the perception of sound localization cues, the Interaural Time Delay (ITD) and the Interaural 
Level Delay (ILD). The ITD applies to lower frequency sounds that bend around the head causing diffraction of sound 
and a time difference between the arrival at the sound at one ear and the arrival at the sound at another ear (<~ 
1500hz for a head circumference of 21cm). The ILD applies to higher frequency sounds that have a smaller wavelength 
(above 1800hz) where the listener’s head causes a shadow resulting in a difference in decibel levels in each ear. This 
also applies to lower frequency sounds heard at close proximity.  
 
The localization cues allow for the perception of the sound’s positioning along the horizontal plane (azimuth). The 
morphology of the listener, the shape of the pinnae, (outer ear), their head, hair and body affects the time at which 
the sound reaches each ear. Distance from the sound source can reduce perception of ILD, making localization 
determined by level difference harder to perceive at greater distances. Each pinnae filters the sound and the same 








                                                        
elevation and helps the listener to determine whether the sound is located in front or behind them (Moore 2012: 251) 
(Begault 1994:42). The head also causes ‘blind spots’ in the perception of the source location, known as ‘the cone of 
confusion’ (Moore 2012: 262). Head movements can mitigate this effect and help to establish the perception of the 
sound source on the vertical plane.  Moore suggests that the pinnae themselves modify the spectral cues and are 
important for clarifying positioning on the vertical plane.118 
 
 
119 McGurk & MacDonald’s (1976) experiments showed that participants watching a video of mouthing lips synced 
with the sound of a similar word with a different phoneme (ba & ga) led to many of participants hearing a 
combination of the two words (da), known as the McGurk Effect, where with visual cues ‘dominate’ auditory cues. 
There are a number of individual, linguistic and environmental factors that affect cross-modal interpretation of 













                                                        




































                                                        
 
120 Influenced by the formalist programme of mathematics, information processing and computational, analogies for 
the brain have been used as metaphors and also as models for brain functioning and cognition. Turing (1950) 
describes the premise of a machine that can potentially be mistaken for a human intelligence. A pre-programmed 
device operates systematically. It receives an input signal, such as light switched on or the engagement of a cog. The 
input results in a particular state – ‘cog engaged’. This state produces a predetermined output, actions or further 
states, according to its “rule book”, or system. “The internal state at any moment is determined by the last state and 





















                                                        
 
121 Shapiro’s (2011) literature review of embodied cognition argues that classical cognitive psychology already 
acknowledges the role of body in perception and cognition, as the sensory input that results in symbolically encoded 
output. Embodied cognition, he suggests challenges the existing computational models by re-examining the intra and 
inter relationships of cognition, the body and the environment. The field of embodied cognition Shapiro argues is 
characterised by three approaches, ‘conceptualization’, ‘replacement’ and ‘constitution’. Proponents of 
‘conceptualization’, he argues, see embodied cognition as constrained and defined by the limits of the perceiver’s 
body. ‘Replacement’ refers to approaches that frame the mind-body-environment as a dynamic system of 
relationships, substituting the classical computational cognitive model of the brain. J.J. Gibson’s (1979) ecological 
approach to vision is attributed as a forerunner this position, positing causal relationships between perception, bodily 
movement and cognition.  The third conception of embodied cognition is the ‘constitution’ thesis that develops the 
existing computational model to argue that cognition extends beyond the brain and into the body as ‘extensions of 
mind’, as put forward by proponents such as Andy Clark (1997, 2008). 
 
Neuroscience research (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004), (Clark 1997), (Barsalou 2009) (Gazzola & Keysers 2008) has been 
used to support the conceptualization and constitution positions of embodied cognition. Voluntary action, prior to 
performance by the body, occurs through the representation of motor and perceptual processes in neural structures 
(Decety & Stevens 2009:3). Neuronal imaging has shown that when thinking about a movement, patterns of neurons 
fire in areas of the brain associated with imagining the movement and also in areas of the brain associated with the 
performance of the motor action (Decety & Stevens 2009) (Decety et al 1994) (Rizzolatti et al 1992). These findings 
suggest that physical movement and thinking about physical movement have neurological correlates. This has 









                                                        
122 J.J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Hove: Taylor & Frances, 1986 [1977], p. 205. 
 
123 The term Grand Illusion was coined by Noë, Thompson and Pessoa in 2002 












                                                        
124 “Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of 
what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness 
are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition 
which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state which in French is called distraction, and 






















                                                        
 
125 Hypnotic suggestion has been interpreted as affecting attention and altering visual, auditory, somatosensory and 
pain perception (Spiegel 2008:185). The ‘Stoop Effect’ was reduced in some participants who had undergone 
experiments using hypnotic suggestion (Raz et al 2002: 1155). In recent fMRI studies (Müller et al 2012: 164) describe 
increased activation of neuronal motor imagery in participants during hypnotic suggestion. If perception can be 
affected through focused attention and suggestion, narrative experiences can potentially affect the phenomenal 












































                                                        
 









                                                        
 
128 For Searle (2015: 5, 41) Perceptual experiences “require reference to the experience itself`” – they are “casually 
self reflexive.” “Perceptual experiences are direct presentations of their conditions of satisfaction, and they are 
experienced as caused by their conditions of satisfaction.” 
 
























                                                        
 
130 James (1899: 14) at times leaves this position open and consistent with his pluralist philosophy contemplates the 












































                                                        
 
131 Wilfred Sellars (1963: 128) draws attention to the assumptions, he says, that sense datum theories distinguish 
between the ‘sense-content’ and the relational act of sensing. He says those that hold this view commonly take 
‘sense-content’ (that which is perceived) to be the foundation of non-inferential empirical knowledge, while 
simultaneously holding the contradictory position that it is (unreliable) secondary qualities – ‘particulars’ – that are 
actually sensed, while non-inferential facts are not taken to be particulars. Sellars questions that either sense-data or 
non-inferential facts can either constitute, or be the foundations of knowledge. Sellars (1963: 161) says that 
sensations may be essential in forming associative connections with the concepts of the particulars of objects, 
however, red can be causally mediated by sensations of red, without the mistaken idea that the what is denoted by 
red are “really sensations” rather than “red physical objects”. What is denoted by red is the red object, not sensations. 
 
According to Sellars there is no pre-conceptual or pre-lingusitic knowledge. To have a concept of having a thought 
requires the linguistic concept of having a thought. Sellars questions that we have knowledge of the world because we 
have sensations and thoughts or that we have private concepts thoughts or sensations. Sellars (1963: 177) argues that 
to align awareness of thoughts with sensations is wrong. Instead he puts forward “…a modified form of the view that 
thoughts are linguistic episodes.” ‘The Myth of the Given’ is replaced with ‘The Myth of Jones’.  Sellars’s ‘The Myth of 
Jones’ separates “inner episodes” into two categories, thoughts and sensations. Where his model of inner thoughts is 
that which results from public language (1963: 187). In Sellar’s account thought comes before language so the 
individual does not know they are thinking until the thoughts are expressed in concepts – knowing requires concepts 
that are ‘public knowledge’ from language that is socially constructed.  
 
“My myth [of Jones] has shown that the fact that language is essentially an intersubjective 
achievement, and is learned in intersubjective contexts – a fact rightly stressed in modern 
psychologies of language, thus by B.F. Skinner, and by certain philosophers, e.g. Carnap, 
Wittgenstein – is compatible with the "privacy" of "innerepisodes." (Sellar’s 1963: 189) 
 
Sellar’s (1963: 170) echoes Peirce and Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning and the general – language acquires its 








                                                        
sense-data, nor he says, conceived after Hegel as circular, but a “…it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any 
claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.” (1963: 170) 
 
132 But arguably this is a linguistic construing of the problem. Alternatively, by choosing to take the view that language 
as referential makes an ontological assertion that there are objects that function in the world, that distinguishes them 
from thoughts about objects or terms. This does not mean we cannot also agree with the linguistic argument that our 
awareness is mediated through language. 
 










                                                        
 
134 While Brandom (2011: 55) acknowledges a comparison can be drawn with Derrida’s theory of differénce, the 
deferment of meaning from signifier to signifier, he stresses (2011: 205) for the [linguistic] pragmatist perspective, the 
emphasis, is not on terms, but upon “declarative sentences”. 
 
135 Rorty (1979), Brandon (2011: 160), and many others, cite Wittgenstein’s role in the subsequent philosophical 
emphasis from meaning to (pragmatic) use. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein (2009: x. 90-94) shows 
reporting is normative use of language is a kind of “language-game” learnt as children. Semantic meaning isn’t 
sufficient; it is in the use of words and the context of utterance that meaning is inferred. Discussed further in Chapter 
3, 4 and 5 of this text.  
 








	 1. There	is	discrimination	between	surfaces	or	between	parts	of	the	world,	such	as	sound	frequencies	occurring	within	unfolding	events.	The	manner	of	discrimination	is	determined	by	the	structure	of	the	brain	that	has	evolved	to	identify	difference	in,	proximity,	temporality,	light,	weight,	between	edges	and	solids	etc.	2. Awareness	of	the	environment	is	the	attentional	system’s	discrimination	between	the	contents	of	events.	3. Proprioception	(Goldman	2012:	71),	for	example,	can	be	seen	as	a	type	of	internal	representational	awareness	of	our	body’s	position	in	proximity	to	other	objects.		4. When	we	observe	how	we	feel	or	what	we	perceive	we	do	not	have	direct	access	the	world	or	to	the	processes	that	transform	our	bodily	interactions	with	the	world	into	perceptions	and	thoughts.	5. Awareness	of	self	and	thinking	is	not	a	private	language.	Thought	occurs	within	public	language	–	that	a	species	evolved	and	with	human	disposition	to	learn	the	particular	language	of	our	social	cultural	context.	(some	see	level	3	and	4	as	one).	
                                                        
 























                                                        
 














                                                        
 


















Fig. 20 The Lost Index, No. 1: Landscape with Figures, for Plymouth City Museum and Art Gallery, version 1, 
‘suggestion’. Screenshots from the final app. 		
                                                        
 
140 Tapping a button on the phone to indicate location has been used as a positioning technique in a number of 










                                                        
 
141 Computer adventure games, first developed in 1975 as text only, by Will Crowther, (Montfort 2005: 10)  
 










Fig. 21 The Lost Index, No. 1: Landscape with Figures, for Plymouth City Museum and Art Gallery, version 1, 










                                                        
 
143 The coding of the app and the interface was designed in collaboration with James Brocklehurst. EW described the 

































































































                                                        
 
144 “The feeling of q knows whatever reality it resembles, and either directly or indirectly operates on. If it resemble 
without operating, it is a dream; if it operate without resembling, it is an error.” (MT 1909 [1887]: 28) 
 




























                                                        









                                                        
 
147 Michael Dummett (1959) traces the origins of the deflationary account to Frege. Dummett, M. (1959). 
‘Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 59: 141–162 Frege, G. (1977 [1918]). ‘Thoughts’. In. Frege, G. 
Logical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
148 Jackman (1998: 156) cites James’ description of propositions as “mongrel curs that have no real place between 








                                                        










































                                                        
 
150 Cheryl Misak (2013: 211) puts that there is no reason to believe that Goodman read the classical pragmatists 











                                                        
 








                                                        
 
152 “Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only when the experience is 'taken,' i.e., 
talked-of, twice…” (1912: 23) 
 
153 Abstract concepts are only “snap-shots” (1909a: 235) taken from our experience and while useful they have no 
value in themselves. 
 
“…so the system grows completer, and new reality, as it comes, gets named after and 
conceptually strung upon this or that element of it which we have already established. The 
immutability of such an abstract system is its great practical merit; the same identical 
terms and relations in it can always be recovered and referred to change itself is just such 





























                                                        
 
154 Putnam draws from Quine’s example in Quine, W. V. (1970) Philosophy of Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 















                                                        
 
155 James makes a similar point: 
 
“…thought proper must  have had an exclusively practical use. Men classed their origin of 
sensations, substituting concepts for them, in order to 'work them for utility what they 
were worth,' and to prepare for what might lie ahead. Class-names suggest consequences 
that have attached themselves on other occasions to other members of the class — 
consequences which the present percept will also probably or certainly show.” 












































                                                        
 
156 This point is close to Peirce’s argument for characterising our beliefs about existents. If a belief is determinate its 
characteristics inhere within it or is predicated of it or its negative. To affirm that something is a pen is to confirm all 
the particulars of a pen. To deny that something is a pen is to “vaguely” deny some, or all, particulars of a pen. When a 
predicate is unanalyzable, for example when knowledge or experience does not permit it (the pen often leaks), it does 
not affect whether the predicate is affirmed or denied, it is an intermediary, “nascent” state. In cases where there is a 
definite division “or borderline” between affirming and denying the predicate then the concepts of determination, 








































                                                        
 
157 This is a point that James makes,  
 
“Ether-waves and your anger, for example, are things in which my thoughts will never 









                                                        
chromatic fringes and to the hurtful words and deeds which are their really next effects.” 




















                                                        
 
158 Arguably the reader is drawing on their memory of other texts in addition to their own experiences. 
 








                                                        
 
160 This contextual knowledge includes a range of extraneous details: the book’s cover, title, genre etc., and in other 

































                                                        
 
161 “Reality consists of existential particulars as well as of essences and universals and class-names, and of existential 
particulars we become aware only in the perceptual flux. The flux can never be superseded. We must carry it with us 
to the bitter end of our cognitive business, keeping it in the midst of the translation even when the latter proves 
illuminating, and fall back on it alone when the translation gives out. 'The insuperability of sensation' would be a short 









                                                        
162 James makes a similar point: 
 
“…thought proper must have had an exclusively practical use. Men classed their origin of 
sensations, substituting concepts for them, in order to 'work them for utility what they 
were worth,' and to prepare for what might lie ahead. Class-names suggest consequences 
that have attached themselves on other occasions to other members of the class — 
consequences which the present percept will also probably or certainly show.” (1911 SP: 

































Fig. 22 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, for Plymouth City Museum and Art Gallery, version 1, sketch of initial 
interaction design. 	The	back-story	and	the	app’s	instructions	are	introduced	by	the	phone	ringing.	A	recorded	message	informs	the	participant	they	are	under	surveillance,	and	their	help	is	required	to	rebuild	the	lost	index.	As	the	phone	call	ends,	an	on-screen,	military	styled163	index	appears	with	a	list	of	four	objects	that	could	be	found	somewhere	in	the	museum,	accompanied	by	a	number	located	nearby	that	could	be	entered	into	the	index.	These	objects	are	‘randomly’	generated	from	a	potential	twenty-five	objects	listed	in	the	app’s	database.			
                                                        
 
163 The interface design was created by James Brocklehurst in response to the layout designs and requirements 
















Fig. 23 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 1 ‘treasure hunt with buttons’, screenshots from app prototype 
showing timer and index input fields. 	
		 		 		
Fig. 24 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 1 ‘treasure hunt with buttons’, screenshots from app prototype 













                                                        
 
164 EW outlined the slider mechanism and James Brocklehurst implemented the code. The idea of a slider mechanism 
was suggested by Shane Myrbeck at Arup, San Francisco, April, 2012, in the context of a different discussion 
concerning Pure Data objects. 
 
165 In addition to EW and JB, fourteen students aged 16-21 and two teachers aged 35-40 tested the second iteration. 
This group was able to understand the narrative premise and game rules without further instruction.  They provided 
feedback via questionnaires this was not as detailed as that recorded using semi-structured interviews. 
 
The third iteration was tested by nine museum staff aged between 36-56 who generally found the narrative confusing, 
the participation mechanism hard to understand and the sounds either too loud or too quiet. A couple of these 
participants found the game “stressful”. These issues are detailed in Appendix 1, figs 25-27. 
Participants in the 16-21 age bracket generally were able to describe the narrative premise and had no difficulty with 








































                                                        
 









Fig. 25 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 2 ‘treasure hunt with iBeacons’, initial plan for  




Fig. 26 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 2 ‘treasure hunt with iBeacons’, iBeacons being installed  










Fig. 27 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 2 ‘treasure hunt with iBeacons’, screenshots from prototype app 

















Fig. 29 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 2 ‘treasure hunt with iBeacons’, still from video demonstrating app 

























Fig. 30 The Lost Index: NATMUS, for The National Museum of Denmark, exterior of the museum. 		Developing	the	tenth	prototype,	The	Lost	Index:	NATMUS.	Version	1:	Expanded	story.	Published	on	iTunes,	December	2015167	
	What	emerged	from	the	development	of	The	Lost	Index,	No.2:	The	Turning	was	that	some	participants	found	the	app	enjoyable,	many	reported	misperceptions	and	engaged	in	
                                                        
 
167 This very recent locative narrative meant limited opportunity for gaining feedback from participants. Re-siting of 






















































   
 






































































                                                        
 































Fig. 3 Diagram of Jamesian relational analysis: example of relation descriptors. 
	 	The	aim	of	this	approach	was	not	the	assertion	of	positivist	empirical	metric.	It	is	a	method	of	articulating	aspects	of	locative	narrative	experience	and	making	speculative	interpretations,	from	which	hypotheses	can	be	formulated	and	implemented	within	the	design	process	and	also	for	the	purpose	of	creating	narratological	analyses.	Individual	reports	were	analysed	in	
Quality or action
































































Fig 4. Diagram of locative narrative 




















































affect of the 
metaphor of 
multi-stability
Changing the relations to 
perceptual and imaginary 
objects (strategies of 
representation and 
composing the context)
Influencing the value of 
belief (suggestion, attention 
focusing, misdirection)
Influencing the values of 
fiction and representation
of perceptual objects 
(representation/simulation 
of sensory cues)
Changing the relations to 
the experiences of 
perception and 
misperception (through 
enjoyment and/or interest, 
promoting volition, to 
imagine, act on imagining 
and belief)




























































                                                        
 

















































                                                        
 
170 Denham and Winker (2015: 601) multi-stability is described as taking place in perceptual processes within and 











































Fig. 1, The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1 (‘scattered voice points) 
 
Narrative Design Table 
The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1: scattered voice points. 
What is the narrative content and structure? The related questions/issues. 
The correspondence is transcribed from original 
letters in the Dartington Hall Trust archive.  
Which parts of the letters should be 
selected?  
 
The letters are coded by reoccurring themes: 
names, places, friends, dates and ‘the 
experiment’. 
How should the story be constructed 
(writer, date, travel destination, topic)? 
The letters are divided into voices, and 
reoccurring themes are ordered by the date 
letters were sent. A partially linear story 
emerges that at times goes out of chronological 
sequence because of actual delays in the 
receipt of the post by the recipients. The story 
can be divided into sections with separate 
sound files heard in particular points within the 
location.  
In what order should the participant 
encounter elements of the story? 
 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
See sound design table fig. 3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
The story can be developed using a branching 
path mechanism punctuated by questions such 
as, “what were Dorothy’s friends in Rome 
saying…?”  
What is the effect of the requirement to 
press multiple-buttons on the engagement 
with the narrative? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussionè 
Using questions to motivate the selection of 
narrative sections requires a rationale that 
is integrated into the story. What is the 
participant’s role in the story? How does 
their role relate to the genre of the story? 
‘Who’ within the narrative is generating the 
questions? 
What are the implications for the choices 
made? How does the selection this affect 
the narrative? 
Alternative mechanisms for triggering story 
sections can be tested:  
• Rules can define how the story world 
operates.  
• Descriptions of the story-world, 
environment, characteristics and 
occupants. 
• Vignettes of situations or characters, 
lifted from the letters. 
• Stories framed within stories. 
• The narrative structure can be 
organized into zones associated with 
the different travel locations, to create 
a story world. 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion. 
 
How are the different locations 







The locations can simulate the actual places 
where the letters where written or that they 
describe. 
How can the destinations be simulated?  
See sound design table fig. 2 for concurrent 
discussion.  
What is the role of the participant in the 
story? 
The destinations can be simulated in spatial 
sound using historically accurate sounds. 
See sound design table fig. 2 for concurrent 
discussion è 
The order of the narrative is determined by the 
order that the different zones are encountered. 
The zones can be liked to entering a re-
enactment of an historical location. The 
participant has accidently discovered this access 
to the past. 
How do the participant’s make sense of the 
story? 
The story is fragmentary, reflecting the 
experience of the recipients of the letters. 
Participants can wander freely or work out 
themes or the chronology of the letters and visit 
the zones accordingly. 
How do participants know where to walk? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion  
How are the relationships between the voices 
and the travel destinations established? 
See sound design table fig.3 for concurrent 
discussionè 
What are the relationships between the real-
world locations and zones? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
 
Fig. 2 The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1 ‘scattered voice points’: Participation Design Table 
 
The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1: scattered voice points. 
Participation Design 
How can participation be developed? The related questions/issues. 
Dartington Hall Gardens will be the initial 
location for the story because of its factual basis 
for part of the story.  
How does the participation with the story 
relate to participation in the location? 
The story could be heard on headphones as a 
single sound file while walking in the location.  
Should the sound file have an 
accompanying map? What are the 
implications for the route? 
 
See narrative design table fig. 1 for 
concurrent discussion of the implications 
for the narrative structure è 
In order to bring the story world into the real 
world, story locations could make visual and 
auditory connections with points within the 
garden. 
A predefined route can be fairly prescriptive 
and passive experience. How can the 
participant be given more agency within the 
story and the experience? 
The story can be divided into sections with 
separate sound files heard in particular points 
within the location.  
 
In what order should the sections be heard? 
What participation mechanism could 
determine how the files are heard? 
What is the relationship of the points with 
the separate sound files?  
 
See sound design table fig. 3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
The story can be developed using a branching 
path mechanism punctuated by questions – “do 
you want to hear letter from Rome or discover 
What is the effect of the requirement to 
press multiple-buttons on the engagement 







who…?” Choices are correlated with a point in 
space in locative narrative. Using GPS sufficient 
space between ‘choices’ is required or multiple 
triggering occurs. 
 
See narrative design table fig. 1 for 
concurrent discussion è 
Using questions to motivate the selection of 
narrative sections requires a rationale that is 
integrated into the story. This can lead to many 
potential choices that require a rationale within 
the story.  
See narrative design table fig. 1 for 
concurrent discussion è 
Alternative mechanisms for triggering story 
sections tested. Story sections, heard as sound 
files, can be ‘discovered’ - triggered by the 
participant’s physical position via GPS. 
How does the participant discover the 
sound files?  
 
 
How does the discovery affect the narrative 
structure? See narrative design table fig. 1 
for concurrent discussion è 
A model of a story world a predefined world 
with its own logic, rules and attributes could be 
an appropriate model to explore. The narrative 
structure can be organized into zones 
associated with the different travel locations. 
The locations can simulate the actual places 
where the letters where written or that they 
describe. 
How does the participant know where the 




The app can include a map that overlays the 
garden with the fictional places. Areas of the 
garden become, the San Franciscan Hills, New 
York, Yosemite National Park, Dartington, San 
Francisco Harbour and Rome of 1925. The 
participant uses the map to find the fictional 
place. 
Where are the edges of the zones? How are 
the voices and locations heard together?  
See sound design table fig. 3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
GPS data has been collected for 58 voice point 
locations within the fictional places. ‘Narrative 
voice points’ identified with the zones that 
utilize the existing features of the garden 
design, such as benches, sculptures, focal points 
etc. Basic prototype made that triggers generic 
sounds that identify the zones. The aim is that 
these fictional places are experienced as 
soundscapes and voice (exerts from the letters). 
At the edges of zones adjacent zones can be 
heard faintly, this could be an interesting in 
terms of hearing the distance sounds of a town 
as you approach. 
Multiple zones and voices are erroneously 
triggering at the same time. This makes the 
voices repetitive and confusing. How can 
the affects of ‘drifting’ GPS points be 
overcome? 
 
The sound sources can appear to issue from 
sources in the location. The veridicality could be 
increased by the sounds responding 
dynamically to the participant’s position, in 
terms of volume and intensity. Experimentation 
with combining the hardware of the 
smartphone: the gyroscope and accelerometer. 
Sufficient accuracy could not be achieved to 
binaurally synthesize the files dynamically 
because of the variation in the GPS accuracy. 
There are also issues surrounding the direction 
How could this be achieved using the 
hardware of the smartphone without 







of the head that cannot necessarily be equated 
with the direction that the phone is held. 
Participants’ speed of walking can effect the 
alignment of the sound files (voices and 
represented environments) with the specific 
points in the garden. A zone can be walked 
through and into another while the first sound 
file is still playing? 
How can the sound environments and 
associated letter fragments be ‘tethered’ to 
specific areas of the garden though 
participation and/or by sound design? How 
does a participant know when they have 
entered or exited a zone? 
 
See sound design table fig.3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
How do participants interact and make 
sense of the fragments? 
 
As the participant walks the GPS that is used to 
trigger the sounds in the sound zones drift 
around, turning on and off. Zones also drift into 
each other and are heard simultaneously 
making them incomprehensible. Zones trigger 
multiple times, making the experience 
incomprehensible and irritating.  
 
EW suggests different preconditions, such 
as, zones not triggering for 10 minutes after 
they have initially triggered. When zones 
retrigger, the question emerges should they 
start from the beginning or resume where 
they the participant exited the sound. JB 
implements zones resuming where they last 
left off unless completed after 10 min and 
then they start from the beginning.   
This alleviates some problems but does not 
stop zones overlapping. EW suggests 
precondition that no zones can play 
simultaneously and zones play to the end 
even if the participant is no longer in the 
zone. 
There are long gaps between zones and voices 
that suggest that the software has stopped 
working and disrupt the experience. 
EW suggests a background track that plays 
throughout the experience. JB suggests 
treating the background a large zone with a 
GPS radius that sits behind the other zones. 
 
The map can indicate when the participant has 
entered or exited the zone. Discussion with 
James Brocklehurst regarding changing the 
colour or texture of the zone on the map? 
How should the map be designed? How can 
the real world and the represented travel 
destinations be overlaid? What colour 
scheme, icons, landmarks should be 
included? 
A simplistic map that uses a plan with shaded 
colour areas overlaid to indicate the fictional 
places. 
Should the fictional places be labeled? 
When should the label appear, before or 
after it has been found? How can the map 
indicate that a fictional place has been 
visited or that the participant is in the 
fictional place when they revisit it? Should 
there be a change of colour to indicate the 
two different states? 
Participants could choose different sense 
making approaches, such as, walking within a 
specified area, following particular characters, 
or subjects. Each mode of participation reveals 











Fig. 3 The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1 - ‘scattered voice points’: Sound Design Table 
 
The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1, scattered voice points.  
Sound Design Table 
How can the sound be designed? The related questions/issues. 
How can the letters be communicated in 
sound? The letters are divided into voices of 
the writers, Dorothy and Leonard (referred to 
as Jerry) and soundscapes of seven of the travel 
destinations featured in the letters during 
January to end of March. 
What tone should the voices take? How 
should participants relate to the characters?   
 
In what order should the participant 
encounter elements of the story? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
What is the role of the participant in the 
story? 
See narrative design table fig.1 for 
concurrent discussion è 
Initial voice recordings of thirty exerts from the 
letters. Experiments with whispered fragments 
and voices overheard, stumbled across. The 
voices need to be clearer enough to covey the 
story elements. 
Which voice actors should record the 
voices? 
 
How should the voices be heard in the 
location? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
The locations can simulate the actual places 
where the letters where written or that they 
describe using spatial sound recorded 
binaurally and synthesized in postproduction.  
Should the soundscapes be made with 
historically accurate material?  
 
Historically accurate sounds may make the 
representated environments more believable. 
Development of an inventory of sounds of the 
period pertaining to each of the representated 
environments. Films of the period provide a 
source of information about the types of 
sounds hear the cityscapes of the period – 
regarding London, Rome and New York and the 
quality of the voices. Jack Benny in Taxi Tangle 
(1925)  
How can the recorded sounds appear to be 
naturalistic?  
 
Historically accurate sounds can be used as key 
sounds or Soundmarks (Schafer 1994 [1977]: 6) 
to evoke the locations of 1925, in compositions 
with ahistorical sounds.  
How many sounds make up a sound zone? 
Can stereo and binaural sounds be 
combined? 
The fictional places are in effect are short films 
without the visuals that require Soundmarks 
(Schafer) and layers of sound that are 
appropriate to the environments of 1925.  
 
The veridicality of sounds could be increased by 
the sounds responding dynamically to the 
participant’s position, in terms of volume and 
intensity. 
How could this be achieved using the 
hardware of the smartphone without 
external sensors or head-mounted devices? 
See participation design table fig.1 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
The order of the narrative is determined by the 
order that the different zones are encountered. 
How do the participant’s make sense of the 
story? See narrative design table fig.1 for 







The zones can be liked to entering a re-
enactment of an historical location. The 
participant has accidently discovered this 
access to the past. 
 
How do participants know where to walk? 
See participation design table fig.2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
How are the relationships between the voices 
and the travel destinations established? 
See sound design table fig.3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
What are the relationships between the real-
world locations and zones? 
See participation design table fig.2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
The spatial sound has been created using in-ear 
binaural mics that encodes my morphology into 
the recordings. Binaural sounds produced in 
post-production use averaged head related 
transfer function (HRTF) data. 
Is it necessary to use HRTF data, create a 
different version for different head sizes (as 
used in Papa Sangre (2010) smartphone 
game)? 
While HRTF tailored more to individual 
participants would offer a more precise spatial 
rendering of the sounds, it seems there is 
sufficient information in the two types of 
binaural sounds incorporated into the 
soundscapes for many of the sounds to seem 
like they occupy space. 
How can the interactive be experienced by 
moving body in space with as little sense of 
mediation as possible to encourage 
immersion in story worlds and the 
suspension of disbelief? 
See participation design table fig.2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
What are the effects of listening to spatial 
























































































































































































































































































































































































                                                        
 
171 Peirce, C. S. (1877)‘The Fixation of Belief  
Peirce, C. S. (1878) ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ 
Peirce, C. S. (1905) ‘What Pragmatism Is’ 
Peirce, C. S. (1905b) ‘‘Issues of Pragmaticism’ 
Peirce, C. S. (1906) Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’ 
 
172 As described in chapter 1, the word pragmatism was given its first public expression by James at the California 
Union address172 given in New York in 1898. 
 
173 In an article by Christine Ladd-Franklin, a former student of Peirce, ‘Charles S. Peirce at the Johns Hopkins’ Journal 
of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods (1916) Vol.13, No.26, p.715-722, Ladd-Franklin cites a letter from 
Peirce to herself, circa 1902. Peirce’s letter describes that he introduced his doctrine of pragmatism, at ‘The 
Metaphysical Club’ he claims he initiated in the 1860’s with members including Chauncey Wright, Nicholas St. John 
Green, William James, and others, usually with half a dozen members present at a time. “It was there that the name 
and the doctrine of pragmatism saw the light.”(1916: 719) Peirce says a paper he had written “was much admired” by 
the members. It was later written up and printed as, ‘The Fixation of Belief ’ and printed in (1877) Popular Science 
Monthly, November. 
“I should say that the word pragmatism does not appear in that article, nor did I insert it in the 
Century Dictionary or ever use it in print previous to the article in Baldwin's Dictionary [1902: 322].” 
(1916: 719) 
“Pragmatism is one of the results of my study of the formal laws of signs, a study guided by 
mathematics and by the familiar facts of every-day experience and by no other science whatever. It is 
a maxim of logic from which issues a metaphysics very easily. It solves almost all problems of 
metaphysics in short metre and it solves them in such a way as never to bar the way of any positive 
inquiry. It also has the gratifying effect of encouraging the simplest ideas of religion and 









                                                        
 
174 Peirce announces his renaming pragmatism to pragmaticism in his essay ‘What Pragmatism Is’ (1905a: 165) in 
order to distinguish his doctrine from ideas that pragmatisim had become associated with, as expressed by James, 
Schiller and unspecified others that were at variance with his own theory.    
 
175 Thought is one system of relations, sensations are another. (1923 [1878]: 40). 
 
176 Scottish empirical philosopher and psychologist Alexander Bain’s writings on habit, in Emotions and the Will (1876) 
and Senses and the Intellect (1879) influenced both Peirce and James (1890a: 122-123). James (1890b: 6, 12) cites 
Bain’s view that sensations do not have knowledge of things and that as concurring with his own view. James (1890a: 
245) praises Bain’s notion of the stream of thought in Emotions and the Will with reference to his own formulation of 
the stream of thought. He critiques Bain’s limited account of the self (1890a: 306, 313, 330, 345) and is highly critical 
of his account of the association of thoughts (1890a: 2, 569, 589, 593, 598, 600-601). James critiques Bain’s accounts 
of attention (1890a: 402) discrimination and comparison (1890a: 485, 530), memory (1890a: 653) and imagination 
(1890b: 69) perception of space (1890b: 186, 271-272, 281) reality (1890b: 295-296, 319, 322-323) reasoning (1890b: 
348, 361), movement (1890b: 372 -373) instinct  (1890b: 406, 411, 419, 429, 432) emotions (1890b: 458, 463, 466, 
472, 474, 476, 484-485, 681) and criticism of his views on the will (1890b: 493, 525, 551-555, 580) 
 
177 This view is expressed by James in Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902) Vol. 2, p.321 and again 









                                                        
 
 
178 Peirce rejects what he sees as James’ interpretation of pragmatism expressed in Will to Believe (1896) (although 
the word pragmatism is not mentioned in this book) and Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (1898). 
Peirce’s criticism is that James’ expression of the maxim, taken as the end of belief is action, has the potential idealist 
implications (1902:322). Peirce’s later pragmaticism (1905a: 174-176) emphasizes “generals” (truths) rather than 
“conduct” as outcomes to of clear idea ideas. The Peirce’s aforementioned letter (circa 1902) to Christine Ladd-
Franklin, later published Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods Peirce continues to outlines his 
views on the differences between William James’ formulation of pragmatism and his own. Exerts from the letter cited 
in the 1916 article:  
“Although James calls himself a pragmatist, and no doubt he derived his ideas on the subject from me, yet there is a 
most essential difference between his pragmatism and mine. My point is that the meaning of a concept...lies in the 
manner in which it could conceivably modify purposive action, and in this alone. James, on the contrary, whose 
natural turn of mind is away from generals, and who is besides so soaked in ultra-sensationalist psychology that like 
most modern psychologists he has almost lost the power of regarding matters from the logical point of view, in 
defining pragmatism, speaks of it as referring ideas to experiences, meaning evidently the sensational side of 
experience, while I regard concepts as affairs of habit or disposition, and of how we should react.” (1916: 718) 
Peirce’s argument “…concepts as affairs of habit…” dovetails with Brandom’s (2011) linguistic pragmatic account of 
rationality.  
 








                                                        
named as Pragmaticism) and James’ principle of pragmatism is James’ emphasis in determining the meaning of 
proposition in terms of its particular future experience and Peirce’s emphasis on future conduct (action) generally. 
 
 
180 Peirce is writing about himself in the third person here (1905a: 162-164). Here Peirce seems to be distancing 
himself from the provisional value of truth asserted by James, although Peirce (1905a: 177) says that while ultimate 
truth is attainable we would probably not recognise it to be so. 
 
181 Peirce (1905a: 168 foot notes) makes clear he is using the word truth in opposition to the word doubt and not to 
qualify degrees of truth. 
 
182 Peirce (1905a: 167-68) does not define here exactly what he means by “finite stimulus”, we can perhaps infer that 

















                                                        
 
183 Arguably the difference between Peirce’s view – the framing of the individual as operating within the context of 
society – and James’ emphasis on the relevance of “the experienceable environment” as the context for meaning in 
‘The Function of Cognition’ [1887] The Meaning of Truth (1909: 42-43) is that of terminology. 
 
184 James uses the idea of hypothesis testing in the context of individual’s experience, emphasizing that truth is a 
relation experience. James (ref) also refers to the value of the empirical method in epistemological inquiry in various 
disciplines. Peirce identifies how the individual negotiates between these two axes of the individual and societal 
knowledge. 
 
185 James (1912) makes the point that the meaning of concepts leads to further concepts.  
 
186 See previous note 3 regarding Peirce’s change in name from pragmatism to Pragmaticism. 
 
187 This is a key difference between James and Peirce’s positions, as John Dewey (1923) has pointed out. James 
emphasizes the particular situation of a propositions occurrence for its meaning, whereas Peirce frames the 
argument differently saying that signs function because their meaning is that which is shared by the community of 
users. Comparisons can be drawn with Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games on this point.  
 
188 For James the meaning of truth is not a static relation applicable in every situation. The real difference between 








                                                        
 
189 Peirce says, the pragmaticist acknowledges that proper names are common to propositions, but says that rational 
meaning does not support their individual relation to a particular person, for example. Proper names are not treated 
as exceptions to the principle of generality, instead ‘proper names’ are treated as a general category whose function is 
denotative, to “point-out” the name and what it is equivalent to (1905a: 176). 
 
190 James’ discussion of the perception of reality in Principles of Psychology Volume 2: 283 offers a similar analysis with 
different emphasis. 
 
191 Peirce’s ‘adopted consensus’ is akin to James’ function of belief as satisfactory fitting with existing beliefs, within a 
particular context, be it within science, mathematics or personal beliefs.  
 
192 James’ view concurs with Peirce’s emphasis here on the value of experiential facts. 
 
193 Peirce makes the point that truths are generally believed more often than falsities and if this wasn’t the case every 
step towards genuine knowledge would seem like a miracle! (1905a: 178). 
 
194 Chaos is nothing for Peirce in that it is undifferentiated by attention and concepts. For James however ‘pure 
experience’ is undifferentiated sensation but it is not empty it is full, poised potential. James says in Some Problems of 








                                                        
“The perceptual flux as such, on the contrary, means nothing, and is but what it immediately is. No matter how small a 
tract of it be taken, it is always a much-at-once, and contains innumerable aspects and characters which conception 
can pick out, isolate, and thereafter always intend…It shows duration, intensity, complexity or simplicity, 
interestingness, excitingness, pleasantness or their opposites.” (1911:49) 
James’ explanation of the flux shows the difference between the rationalist approach that is reductive and the 
experiential approach that includes the thickness of lived experience. 
 
195 James says he asserts that there is an external reality but ultimately we cannot be sure of this fact. 
 
196 This is a matter of context for James (1909MT) If someone believed that the world is flat, that may be true for them 
but it would not make it necessarily true for others. 
 
197 Peirce’s use of the word continuity here seems to be used as a synonym for his term ‘synechism’ that is briefly 
mentioned at the beginning of the article: if the doctrine of pragmatism (pragmaticism) is proved true, “…it would 
essentially involve the establishment of the truth of synechism” (1905a: 167-168). 
 
198 Peirce’s continuity of thought has resonances with James’ discussion of what it means for ideas to ‘satisfactorily’ 
‘fit’ with existing ideas and only modify them slightly in order that may be accepted as true. 
 
199 The ‘logic of relatives’ is the subject of an earlier article by Peirce (1887: 162) of the same name. The expression 
refers to a particular logic of relationships between terms in a proposition when terms fixed to an object become 










                                                        
 
200 Peirce seems to be referring here to the form of inference he calls Abduction and defined in a following paper in his 
series on Pragmaticism, ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’ (1906: 511), in where he defines Abduction as,  
“Abduction, in the sense I give the word, is any reasoning of a large class of which the provisional adoption of an 
explanatory hypothesis is the type. But it includes processes of thought which lead only to the suggestion of questions 
to be considered, and includes much besides.”  
N.B. Peirce had already discussed abduction in earlier papers including, ‘Hume on Miracles and Laws of Nature’ 
(1901). In. Peirce, C., & Wiener, Philip P. (1966). Selected writings: (Values in a Universe of Chance). New York: Dover, 
p. pp. 289-321.   
 
201 Peirce defines his use of “ultimate nature” here, “meaning in that characteristic element of it that is not reducible 
to anything simpler” (1905b: 482). 
 
202 An earlier formulation of this idea by Peirce seems to that of “feigned doubt” (1923 [1887]: 39). See above for 
discussion. (This idea is close to what contemporary psychology and analytical philosophy would refer to as 












                                                        
 
203 James’ discussion of the role of belief in rationality is discussed in ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’ and ‘Will to 
Believe’ in Will to Believe (1896) 
 
204 “…if the reasoner is conscious, even vaguely, of what his guiding principle is, his reasoning should be called a logical 
argumentation” (1905b: 483). 
 
205 Indirect connections can be made here between Peirce’s ‘associational suggestions of belief’ between an 
individual’s ideas and James’ analysis of hypnotic suggestion by one person to another in Principles of Psychology 
(1890b) 
 
206 Peirce acknowledges that some beliefs are based on sentiment whereas James seems to suggest that sentiment is 
the instigator of many of our beliefs,  ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’ Will to Believe (1896) 
 
207 Peirce acknowledges that the criticism could be leveled here concerning a potential infinite regression of causes of 
effort that precede deliberate conduct but he counters this with a rhetorical response - who seriously considers that 









                                                        
 
208 Principle of contradiction - an idea cannot be true and not true simultaneously. 
 
209 Peirce (1905b: 488-489) differentiates between definite and precise, with precise reserved for signs such as 
numbers and dates.  
 
210 In formal logic Peirce says (1905b: 490) these concepts will be referred to as, singular (determinate), universal 
(general), particular (vague or indefinite). 
 
211 Peirce affirms the basis of Pragmaticism in Kant’s Critique of Reason, with Peirce’s removal of Kant’s idea of the a 
priori transcendental basis of knowing things. 
“The Kantist has only to abjure [renounce the belief] from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself 
can, how ever indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find 
himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist.” (1905b: 491) 
Peirce refers to a “Critical Common-sensist” as one who upholds his the first maxim of Pragmaticism (1905b: 481) - 
There are not only indubitable propositions (unquestionable) but there are also indubitable inferences. For James 










                                                        
 
212 Thematic connections can be made here with James’ description of the edges experience “chromatic fringes” 
(1890) expressed as a subjective experience, rather than within a formal logical framework. 
 
213 Peirce (1905b: 493-494) identifies other types of subjective modality that refer to “Signs or Representamen” 
(Peirce (1906) renames Representamen as the category Sign) where the “Utterer” does not possess total knowledge, 
such as an act of hypostatic abstraction (the predicate is turned into a relation – wool is warm is transformed by an act 
of hypostatic abstraction to wool possesses warmth. The adjective or predicate is transformed into an extra subject 
from warm to warmth). Peirce gives the example if thinking of the possibility that something may happen where there 
is no evidence, while it may not violate logic it can give the meaning “variableness” and the appearance of “Chance”. 
This can make meaning seem as if it is as vague as the person’s thought that it reflects. In the opposite case some one 














                                                        
 
214 John Dewey (1935: 703-704) identifies this argument as one of Peirce’s most important contributions,  
“What in my opinion is Peirce's most characteristic philosophical contribution, namely, his original theory of the 
relation between the existential and the logical, is wholly meaningless if it is not seen that he is speaking of possibility 
and generality as ways or modes that with respect to actualization are potential and general, being actualized only 
under individualized conditions of interaction with other things.” Dewey’s emphasis in own philosophy of the 
importance of the “situation” for meaning perhaps is reflected in his choice of Peirce’s most important contributions. 
Dewey, D. (1935) ‘Peirce’s Theory of Quality’. Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 32, No.26. (Dec. 19, 1935), pp. 701-708. 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2016281 Accessed: 09-03-2015 11:10 UTC 
 
215 In Peirce’s 1878 article ‘How to Make Ideas Clear’, Peirce critiques his example of the diamond in cotton wool that 
sought to illustrate the idea that if a diamond was embedded in cotton wool then it could not practically be said to 
have the qualities of hardness, the quality of hardness being merely a question of nomenclature. Peirce says his use of 
the word merely was wrong because the qualities of an object are not just names by which they are known but 
categories that are either true or false. These generals are either real qualities or imaginary qualities. Peirce reminds 
us that the original maxim of Pragmaticism is based not on what did happen but whether the conclusion reached that 
the success of future practical or logical conduct would lead to that classification, of hardness in this case, based on 











                                                        
 
216 This conception of the present as retrospective is an argument is central to James’ explanation of time self, 
perception and conception of things in Principles (1890a 606)  
 
217 “since involving effort-resistance” is John Dewey’s definition of Peirce’s use of the word conative. Dewey, D. (1935) 
‘Peirce’s Theory of Quality’. Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 32, No.26. (Dec. 19, 1935), pp. 707 
 
218 Peirce says known externally in that it is “not a hallucination” (1905b: 499). 
 
219 ‘The Actual’ refers to the subjective memory of what has past (1905b: 492).  
		
 
 
 
 
350 
For	James	the	meaning	of	truth	is	the	difference	a	belief	makes	to	action	-	what	works	in	a	particular	context.	For	Peirce,	truth	is	what	difference	a	belief	makes	to	conduct	but	conduct	as	a	“stopping	place”	(1923	[1887]:	41)	leading	to	further	concepts	and	beliefs.	Belief	for	Peirce	is	a	rational	process.	Pierce	discusses	belief	in	terms	of	ideas	that	are	general	-	the	focus	is	upon	the	shared	meaning	between	communities	of	users.	For	James	belief	(1897	Will)	in	some	cases	may	be	rational	but	if	there	is	a	choice	between	rational	decisions	the	choice	comprises	aesthetics	and	sentiment.	We	feel	our	rational	interpretation	to	be	true	but	if	examined	closely	will	reveal	that	those	reasons	are	largely	unsupported	by	evidence	and	rest	on	feelings	and	supposition	that	may	be	influenced.			
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